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STRAYING FROM THE PATH
Tracy E. Higgins*
What common ground can be found between modern feminist legal
theory and a century-old essay advocating understanding the law from
the perspective of the "bad man"? The question admits of no simple
answer. Feminists, including myself, might agree with some irony that
"[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it
as a bad man" but would add that this is precisely the problem. Of
course, Holmes does not use the concept of the bad man in a feminist
sense to suggest that the law empowers the bad man at the expense of
women. Indeed, except for a passing reference to Mrs. Quickly's mis-
placed interest in headwear, he does not mention women at all. None-
theless, this essay reveals common ground between Holmes's thought
and feminist legal theory that is both wide and significant. Femi-
nism's departures from The Path - and there are many - reveal just
as readily our different destination.
A generous feminist reading of Holmes's essay suggests that femi-
nist legal theorists, particularly radical feminists, share some of
Holmes's assumptions about the content and functioning of law, if not
his aspirations for it. For example, The Path reflects Holmes's view
that power shapes the content of the law. Quoting Professor Agassiz's
observation that "a German population would rise if you added two
cents to the price of a glass of beer," Holmes notes that "[a] statute in
such a case would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but
because it could not be enforced." Thus, for Holmes, law is coexten-
sive not with any particular moral vision, but with the will and capac-
ity of the sovereign to enforce it. As a descriptive matter, most
feminists would agree with his characterization of law as a manifesta-
tion of social power. Indeed, feminist critiques of legal doctrine often
begin by exploring the relationship between law and patriarchal distri-
butions of power. Yet many feminists would disagree with Holmes's
suggestion that "[tihe first requirement of a sound body of law is, that
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the com-
munity, whether right or wrong."' Such deference to political will
leads as readily to Holmes's opinion in Buck v. Bell2 as to his dissent
in Lochner v. New York. 3 Moreover, feminists would argue that the
relationship between political power and law is not purely instrumen-
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tal: law also operates to shape and reinforce the distribution of power
and can be criticized on those terms as well.
Moving from substance to method reveals another line of con-
tinuity between Holmes and feminist legal theory. Holmes's discussion
of the fallacy of logical form resonates with feminist legal theory, as
well as with legal realism and Critical Legal Studies. Like Holmes,
feminists have had little use for the idea that "a given system, ours, for
instance, can be worked out like mathematics from some general axi-
oms of conduct," particularly in light of the fact that women have
been systematically excluded from the equation.
Many feminists and other critical legal thinkers also join Holmes in
stressing the role of history in understanding the scope and meaning of
legal principles. More importantly, for feminists as for Holmes, history
is not merely an interpretive tool, but a critical one, providing "the
first step toward an enlightened scepticism." Thus, most feminists
readily agree with Holmes that the fact of historical pedigree is not a
justification for a legal rule - that "[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV."
Perhaps the most striking continuity between The Path and mod-
ern feminist legal theory is a shared appreciation of the situatedness or
contingent character of law. For Holmes, this recognition flows from
his rejection of the fallacy of logical form and his emphasis on the role
of power in shaping the contours of law. Acknowledging indetermi-
nacy of a sort, Holmes writes, "[y]ou can give any conclusion a logical
form." He rejects the distortion generated by the assumption that law
is governed by an internal logic. Instead, he suggests that matters of
legal interpretation "are battle grounds where the means do not exist
for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the deci-
sion can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a
given time and place." Formalist reasoning confounds the problem by
concealing the political character of such decisions.
Emphasizing the contingency of knowledge and the importance of
perspective, feminists too have been skeptical of right answers for all
time. We have argued against viewing legal categories - particularly
gender-based categories - as inevitable, natural, or stable over time.
In Holmes's terms, we have attempted to unveil the "concealed, half
conscious battle[s]," and like Holmes, we would argue that these bat-
tles are better fought openly.
If feminists can find points of agreement with Holmes concerning
law's logic, its contingent character, and its reflection of social power,
most feminists would nevertheless disagree with the methodological
prescription Holmes offers in The Path. Criticizing the conflation of
moral and legal reasoning, Holmes observes that "the vague circumfer-
ence of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more
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precise when we wash it with cynical acid." Yet having rejected both
logic and morals as foundations for law, Holmes must either locate an
alternative standard for evaluating legal conclusions or retreat to posi-
tivism. In the second part of The Path, Holmes considers the possibil-
ity that social science can provide such a standard. As a means of
structuring "a study of the ends sought to be obtained and the reasons
for desiring them," social science represents for Holmes a possibility of
preserving something (though not very much) for the realm of legal
reasoning as such.
This methodological resolution is one most feminists have found
profoundly unsatisfying for several reasons. First, in light of the gen-
eral antipathy between feminist legal theory and law and economics,
many feminists lament the prescience of Holmes's suggestion that "the
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of econom-
ics." Feminists have witnessed Holmes's "man of the future" deploy
social science primarily against inefficiency rather than injustice. Sec-
ond, the usefulness of social science as a guide to law and policy de-
pends on the validity of its underlying assumptions about human
nature and human behavior. For Holmes, these assumptions were
largely unexamined. Yet the very contrast between Holmes's atomistic
and amoral "bad man" and feminism's idea of the self in relationship
reveals these underlying assumptions as contested and profoundly
political. More generally, feminists who have been influenced by
postmodernism, including myself, reject altogether Holmes's suggestion
that the solution to the fallacy of logical form can be found in the
apolitical prescriptions of social science. Having experienced a para-
digm shift or two, we no longer see social science or even natural sci-
ence as free from ideology.
For me, and I think for other progressive legal scholars, the cynical
acid bath Holmes describes (and prescribes) is both more and less
powerful than it was for him. It is more powerful because it strips
away not only the language of morals and our faith in logical form,
but also our confidence in economics, statistics, and social science.
Washed with this more powerful cynical acid, Holmes's own theory of
law seems, at best, too limited in its aspiration that law become "more
rational and more civilized" by coordinating means and ends. At
worst, it is simply a positivist description of the functioning of law and
leaves us with little respect or esteem for law that is a mere manifesta-
tion of power. Yet the acid bath is also less devastating for us, be-
cause by eliminating altogether the vague circumference of duty, it
restores moral language, ethics, political theory, history, and social sci-
ence as equal aids in recreating law for our generation.
One hundred years later, it is appropriate to acknowledge not only
our jurisprudential debts to Holmes, but also our departures from his
path. As Holmes himself reminds us, "one may criticise even what one
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reveres" - and, we might add, revere even what one criticizes. Mark-
ing the distance we have come and the detours we have made along
the way toward our destination is at least as important as locating our
shared origins. To paraphrase Holmes's eloquence, as feminists we
should show less than devotion if we did not do what in us lies to
improve our legal tradition, and having perceived the ideal of its fu-
ture, point it out and press toward it with all of our hearts.
